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Abstract: 
Despite the scientific consensus that anthropogenic global warming is occurring, 
public opinion about the existence and seriousness of climate change is mixed. 
Several studies found a political controversy around the issue: people with a right-
wing ideology are generally less likely to belief in human caused climate change and 
to support mitigation, than left-wing people. In order to address this global challenge, 
many academics have researched climate change communication and framing. This 
paper adds to this, by investigating whether framing climate change as an issue of 
national interest increases support for addressing global warming. This experimental 
survey research (N=137) randomly assigned participants to one of the three frames 
(security/immigration, economy, health) or unrelated message (control group) and 
subsequently measured attitudes towards climate change (DV). Furthermore, it 
explored the relationship between a person’s left-right self-placement and climate 
attitudes. Finally, it was researched whether the effects of frames on climate attitudes 
are different for people with different ideologies. The expectation was that frames 
would spark a higher increase for right-wing people than for left-wing persons. 
Regression analysis results show that the security frame increases an individuals’ 
willingness to contribute money, time and energy to fighting climate change with 
0.866 on a 7-point scale (p=.014). Further, it finds that left-wing people score up to 
1.5 higher on their willingness to contribute that than right-wing people (up to 1.5, 
p=.0004). No interaction effect was found between political ideology and 
successfulness of frames. Results suggested that certain frames might be more 
convincing for people with certain ideologies, but this differs per aspect of climate 
change opinion. Although this research is not generalizable to the Dutch population, it 
adds to existing knowledge and attempts to inspire not only future academics, but also 
world leaders to aspire public engagement with climate change. (294 words) 
 
Keywords: climate change, global warming, public opinion, framing, mitigation and 
adaptation, public engagement, communication, attitudes, polarization, left-right 
divide, political ideology, securitization of climate change 
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Does framing climate change as a national issue of security, economy or health, 
increase public support for fighting climate change? 
Section one: introduction 
 
The scientific consensus (over 97% of scientists) is that human caused climate change 
is happening (Maibach, Myers & Leiserowitz, 2014, p. 295). Climate change poses 
severe threats for human life on earth, such as extreme draughts, floods, sea level rise, 
air pollution, distinction of flora and fauna, extreme weather and natural disasters 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014; World Bank, 2012). New 
public policies and changes in individual behavior are necessary to address climate 
change (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). Although most scientists agree that 
mitigation and adaptation should be priority, public support is mixed (Maibach et al., 
2014). In 2013, only 43% of the United States’ citizens believed “most scientists think 
global warming is happening” (Leiserowitz et al., 2014, p. 35). Although skeptical 
voices are less prominent in the Netherlands, Dutch public awareness and concern 
about climate change is also mixed (Hagen, Middel & Sijawka, 2016).  
 The controversy in public opinion about climate change is divided along 
political ideological lines. In the U.S., political ideology or party is the most 
consistent factor in influencing public concern with environmental issues (Hamilton 
& Saito, 2014). Democrats are much more likely to accept climate science and 
support mitigation than Republicans (Hamilton & Saito, 2014, p. 218). Likewise, in 
other countries research has shown that people with a left-wing political ideology are 
more likely than right-wing people to acknowledge the seriousness of climate change 
(Kvaløy, Finseraas & Listhaug, 2012; McCright, Dunlap & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). 
 The difference between the scientific attitude and public attitude on climate 
change is a problem, as it is an obstacle for effective steps in mitigation and 
adaptation. Public opinion on climate change influences whether an individual 
supports mitigation and engages in sustainable behavior. Moreover, the international 
response on climate change is dependent on public opinion, as the public’s concern 
with the issue affects which actions are taken (Lorenzi & Pidgeon, 2006). Therefore, 
not only climate change itself, but also the inaccurate public perception of it, is a 
global challenge (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). 
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Many academics stress the need for research about public engagement with 
the issue of climate change (Nisbet, 2009, p. 22; Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, 
Leiserowitz & Maibach, 2014, p. 879; Connor et al., 2016, p. 473; Schäfer, 2012, p. 
537; Myers, Nisbet, Maibach, Leiserowitz, 2012, p. 111). The topic of 
communication about climate change is much investigated, as this is the key in 
sharing information about it. Communicating scientific evidence has proven to be 
insufficient to persuade people about the urgency of climate change. However, 
exposing people to a particular frame about climate change might increase their 
engagement with the issue. Framing is relevant, since it sets the process in motion 
where people reorient their opinion about an issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 
104). A frame is considered successful if it affects audiences' attitudes and behavior 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 109). If the frame links the environmental issue to an 
already salient issue, interest could be raised. Although effects of climate frames have 
been researched (Egan & Mullin, 2017, p.9), insufficient knowledge exists about what 
kind of frames are successful for what kind of people, especially for non-American 
countries like the Netherlands. 
This paper researches whether framing climate change as an issue of national 
benefit increases public support for addressing climate change. Dutch public opinion 
research shows that citizens perceive immigration, economy and health as top- 
priorities (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau [SCP], 2016, pp. 15-16). Therefore, these 
areas will be used as frames for this research with immigration being part of the 
security frame. The national security frame is especially relevant since the Chief of 
the Ministry of Defense Tom Middendorp is publicly emphasizing climate change’s 
relevance for security (Ministry of Defense, 2016). His words will be used to phrase a 
pro-climate action security frame. The economic frame touches into areas citizens are 
already concerned about: poverty within the own country and employment (SCP, 
2016). This frame includes the Groningen Seaports Director's statement that 
"multinationals cannot survive without thinking green" (NOS, 2017a). The health 
frame emphasizes the risks of climate change for public health and argues that 
fighting climate change benefits people's health (Knol, 2014). 
 The research question is whether framing climate change as an issue of 
national security, economy or health can increase public support for fighting climate 
change. An experimental survey investigates effects of being exposed to a particular 
frame on someone's attitude towards climate change. This attitude will be measured 
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with the following indicators: belief in the existence of human caused climate change; 
the seriousness of the problem; the need for mitigation by governments, companies 
and individuals; individual willingness to contribute to solutions; and support for 
greenhouse gas reduction policy. The effects of the frames will be compared with a 
control group. 
  A Dutch case study is practical and relevant. The political landscape is 
scattered and people perceive different issues as important, which makes it likely that 
certain frames appeal to certain people. Also, the coexistence of recent Dutch public 
opinion research about saliency for the three areas (SCP, 2016), with recent news-
developments in those areas suggests that successful frames could be created. The 
results show whether the three pro-environment frames work to change public 
attitudes and behavior. Further, the analysis investigates the political controversy 
around the issue. The effects of frames on climate attitudes are compared between 
people with different ideologies.  
 
Section two: theoretical framework  
 
Public perception of climate change science 
Despite the scientific evidence and severe dangers of anthropogenic climate change, 
relevant actors insufficiently engage in mitigation and adaptation (Neslen, 2017; 
Mckibben, 2012; van den Broeke et al., 2016). An obvious reason for the lack of 
climate action is the fact that public opinion about the existence and seriousness of 
climate change is mixed (Maibach et al., 2014). Although empirical evidence has 
driven scientists into a consensus, it has driven the public into a political controversy 
(Maibach et al., 2014). Studies show growing climate skepticism in the latter 2000s in 
the United States and Western Europe (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon & 
Upham, 2015). Public attitude on climate change is fluctuating over time. Although 
there has been a growing concern about climate change in many parts of the world, 
recent research points to a lot of skeptics about the existence and seriousness of 
human caused climate change (Capstick et al., 2015).  
In the Netherlands, public opinion about climate change is mixed as well. 
Public opinion research finds that only 21,2% of the Dutch population perceived 
“reducing climate change” as a very important policy priority (Hagen et al., 2016, p. 
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175). This score was much lower than the perceived importance in Spain, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 36,7% of Dutch survey participants believed 
climate change should not be addressed by the government at all, or only as a low 
priority (Hagen et al., 2016, p. 175). Likewise, the outcome of the Dutch elections of 
March 2017 suggests that there is no clear-cut public support of climate action. 
Despite growth amongst green-parties, three of the four largest political parties lacked 
accurate focus on fighting climate change (Mommers, 2017).1 
 
Supporters and opponents of mitigation: left-right divide 
Much research is done on the American public opinion about climate change, which 
correlates with the partisan and ideological divide between Republicans and 
Democrats. Polling results between 2000 and 2008 show that this divide has 
sharpened: an increasing majority of Republicans questioned anthropogenic global 
warming science and its urgency, while Democrats increasingly accepted the science 
and expressed concern. This ideological divide stayed after correcting for knowledge 
and education (Nisbet, 2009, p. 14). Findings of Hmielowski et al. (2014) confirm the 
increasing polarization in opinion about climate change. Their research shows that 
people's opinion is highly dependent on partisan media and the conservative- leaning 
media articulates much more skeptical and denying attitudes towards climate change. 
Republican- leaning media creates doubt about the validity of science in general, 
resulting in doubt about the existence of climate change, while non-Republican media 
increases trust in science, resulting in certainty that climate change is happening 
(Hmielowski et al., 2014).  
 Several recent studies investigated whether the partisan-ideological divide for 
climate change opinion also exists in other countries (McCright et al., 2016). Kvaløy, 
Finseraas and Listhaug (2012) analyzed 47 countries, excluding the Netherlands, and 
found that the public's perception of the seriousness of climate change is indeed 
                                                 
1
 The four biggest political parties in the Netherlands after the elections in March 2017, are People's 
Party for Freedom and Democracy [VVD] (33 seats), Party for Freedom [PVV] (20 seats) and 
Christian-Democratic Appeal [CDA] (19 seats) and Democrats 66 [D66] (19 seats). By using a 
parliamentary search engine (watstemthetparlement.nl), Mommers (2017) analyzed voting behavior of 
political parties within the parliament. He found that the parties VVD, CDA and PVV generally 
opposed important policy proposals to mitigate climate change. For example, VVD and PVV wanted to 
keep coal plants open, even though closing them was expected to reduce CO2 emissions with 31%. 
Also, the VVD, PVV and CDA opposed a CO2-prize, a measure that would improve the functioning of 
the EU Emissions Trade System. On the contrary, D66 has supported and initiated several proposals to 
address climate change (Mommers, 2017). 
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positively correlated with a leftist position on the left-right scale. Likewise, McCright 
et al. (2016) found that in 14 western European countries, including the Netherlands, 
public opinion on climate change is divided along the left-right divide. Left-wing 
people score higher on their belief in climate change and support for mitigation than 
fellow citizens with right-wing ideologies (McCright et al., 2016). In the Netherlands 
right-wing persons are less likely to believe that anthropogenic climate change is 
occurring, to see it as a serious problem, to be personally willing to fight climate 
change and to support policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (McCright et al., 
2016, p. 348). 
 While observing the Dutch political landscape, the ideological left-right divide 
on climate support is also visible in proposed climate policies by political parties.2 
Generally, ambitious climate-proposals and programs came mainly from the political 
left, while parties perceived as right-wing often opposed actions to fight climate 
change (Postma and Luttikhuis, 2017; Mommers, 2017). 
 Recent Dutch public opinion survey research by the institution Sociaal en 
Cultureel Planbureau [SCP] (translation: Social and Cultural Research Institute) 
confirms the notion that opinions about climate change are spread along party-
ideologies (SCP, 2016, p. 30). Their survey included questions to measure citizens’ 
opinion about government spending on climate issues. Respondents were given 17 
areas and they had to judge what should be done with expenses, either more or less 
government spending. One of the areas was “contribute to tackling international 
environmental problems and climate change” (SCP, 2016, p. 14). The average result 
for each area could be between -100 (much less) and +100 (much more), and this area 
scored +16 (SCP, 2016, p. 14). Respondent's judgments about government spending 
were compared, by distinguishing between their political party preferences. Regarding 
                                                 
2
 The left-right dimension is much more complex than the way it is approached in this research. For the 
sake of practicality, this research does not distinguish extensively between different aspects of left-right 
in the Netherlands, such as conservative-progressive; solidary economy-individual responsibility; or 
culture: international- national solidarity (NOS, 2017c). For background knowledge about the political 
landscape in the Netherlands, see Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, and for the left -right conceptualization, see 
Jahn, 2010. This research reviewed the overall left-right placement of Dutch political parties, made by 
the Manifesto Project (as referred to by Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata, n.d.). The Manifesto Project 
is a scientific community with extensive content analyses of parties’ electoral manifestos, so it is a 
valid source to determine parties’ policy positions and placements on the left -right scale 
(https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu). 
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the issue of climate, the allocated resources differed considerably. People with a left-
wing ideology were most in favor of increased spending (Green Left: +68, Party for 
the Animals: +66), followed by people voting Democrats 66 (+46) and Labour Party 
(+45). Other positive scores were given by Christian Union-voters (+16), swing 
voters (+11), Socialist Party-supporters (+9) and Christian Democratic Appeal-voters 
(+7). Only people preferring Party for the Freedom (-31), 50PLUS (-10) and People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (-5) generally wanted the government to spend 
less money on this issue (SCP, 2016, p. 30). These results illustrate that in the 
Netherlands, there is a political controversy around climate change.  
 
Reasons for differing attitudes on climate change 
McCright et al. (2016) talk about underlying reasons for the left-right divide for 
climate change. They conclude that acknowledging and addressing climate change, 
poses a greater challenge to right-wing values than to left-wing values (McCright et 
al., 2016, p. 434). Right-wing people probably have a weaker belief in climate 
change, because they think dealing with climate change will limit private property 
rights, erode national sovereignty, and increase government intervention (McCright et 
al., 2016, p. 348, 350). The latter is touches into the left-right controversy about 
government intervention in the economy. Progressive left-wing tends to be pro-
government intervention, whereas conservative right-wing generally thrusts market 
mechanisms and wants to minimize regulation (Imbeau, Pétry & Lamari, 2001, p. 6). 
According to Klein (2014), acknowledging climate change, would be acknowledging 
a huge form of market failure and accepting that proper action should be taken, which 
is not in line with the ideology that the market regulates itself. Climate change could 
be considered as the ultimate proof that a self-regulating market does not function 
perfectly. People do not like to admit, not even to themselves, that their worldview is 
not in accordance with scientific facts.  
 Bain et al. (Bain et al., 2015, as cited in Connor et al., 2016, p. 465) find 
another aspect of personal values that play a role someone's seriousness about climate 
change: the communality domain. The more warm and caring a person is to others, 
the higher willingness to address climate change (Connor et al., 2016, p. 465). Thus, 
people with strong empathic values are generally more willing to fight climate change 
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than people pursuing self-interest.3 Therefore, convincing people that acting upon 
climate change is in their own interest, has the potential to engage more people with 
the issue. 
 Other personal characteristics are found that positively correlate with a 
person's perceived seriousness of climate change, such as high education, post-
materialism and being religious (Kvaløy et al., 2012, pp. 11, 14). Kvaløy et al. 
expected young people to be more concerned with the climate, but found that 
especially middle-aged people where concerned (2012, p. 17). Another important 
determinant is gender, as research consistently found that women are more supportive 
of addressing climate change (Brody, Zahran & Himansu, 2008, pp. 75, 88). 
  The upper two sections, about the left-right divide in climate attitude, and 
reasons for differing attitudes, discussed many relevant findings. Both in the U.S. and 
other countries, there is political controversy around climate change. Likewise in the 
Netherlands, party behavior and public opinion showed that left-wing is generally 
more pro-climate than right-wing. An underlying reason for the left-right divide might 
be that right-wing ideology is harder to combine with acknowledging climate change. 
To a certain extent, this realization helps to understand the tension between right-wing 
ideology and climate change science. Other characteristics, influencing one’s position 
on climate change, are empathy, education, post-materialism, religion, age and 
gender.  
 
Persuading the opponents of urgency climate change: framing 
There is a huge communication problem around climate change. As solely scientific 
evidence is insufficient to persuade people of the urgency to act upon climate change, 
the research areas communication and framing is relevant. A successful frame 
changes the way a person perceives a concept (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104), by 
creating belief in the content and importance of an issue (Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2012). Strong frames include symbols, heuristics and links to partisan identity, and 
                                                 
3
 It is relevant to make the link between communality domain and political ideologies. Research on the 
links between people's personality and their voting behavior, found that left -wing people generally are 
more empathic. They score significantly higher on values like friendliness and agreeableness, while 
right-wing people score higher on assertiveness and self-confidence (Chirmbolo & Leone, 2010). If it 
is indeed the case that right-wing people are more assertive in pursuing self-interest, this suggests that 
using self-interest phrasing could work to overcome the political ideology controversy around climate 
change. Taking a self-interest angle has the potential to persuade right-wing people of the urgency of 
climate change. 
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are effective in shaping opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 111). Frames can offer 
a solution for the communication problem around climate change, as a successful 
frame could change the way people perceive climate change.  
 Nisbet (2009, p. 15) states that tailored frames are necessary to overcome 
"communication barriers of human nature, partisan identity, and media 
fragmentation". Frames communicate what the problem is, who/what is responsible 
and what should be done about it (Nisbet, 2009, p. 15). Frames link two concepts with 
each other, so that after interpreting it, the audience accepts that connection. A 
specific frame is often only relevant if the concepts are in line with the interpreter's 
pre-existing worldview (Nisbet, 2009, p. 17). Ideally, influential peers frame 
information in a way that resonates with people's background and addresses personal 
information-needs (Nisbet, 2009, p. 22). With regards to framing climate change, 
insufficient research exists about which frames work for which audiences (Nisbet, 
2009, p. 22).  
 
Content and effects of climate change frames 
Nisbet’s (2009) extensive discussion of possible climate frames suggests they can 
serve as effective tools to increase interest. Academics have discussed several 
possible climate change frames. In this section, the mainstream environmental frame 
will be explained, followed by the economic, health and national security frame. 
Finally, alternative frames will be discussed briefly. 
  As Myers et al. explain, the dominant historical frame of climate change 
stresses the environmental aspects (2012, p. 1106). This frame emphasizes the 
consequences for ecosystems and the ecosystem-benefits of mitigation and adaptation 
(2012, p. 1107). Myers et al. researched six climate-attitude groups, representative for 
the U.S. population: the alarmed; concerned; cautious; disengaged; doubtful; 
dismissive. They compared the effects of environmental-, health-, and national 
security frame, on respondents' feelings of hopefulness and angriness. The 
environmental frame did not spark much hope amongst the three skeptic-groups 
(Myers et al., 2012). Connor et al. (2016) compared the nature frame with health, 
development, communality and competence, to research which frames are more likely 
to be passed on in a Facebook-like environment. The conventional nature about 
plants, animals and natural disasters (Connor et al., 2016, p. 465) was most likely to 
be shared (2016, p. 470).  
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 The economic development frame portrays climate change as an opportunity 
for economic growth. According to Nisbet, it engages a wider public by using words 
like "innovative energy technology”, "sustainable economic prosperity” and "creating 
green jobs” (2009, pp. 19-20). Connor et al. used the development frame by stating 
that climate action will result in a future where "we will be using efficient 
technologies that will benefit our economy" and "have a more prosperous society due 
to the creation of new jobs and industries" (2016, p. 467). 
 Another frame Nisbet discussed is the public health frame. It has the potential 
to speak to new audiences concerned with health, by focusing on direct and nearby 
impacts. The frame "stresses climate change's potential to increase the incidence of 
infectious diseases, asthma, allergies, heat stroke, and other salient health problems, 
especially among the most vulnerable populations: the elderly and children" (Nisbet, 
2009, p. 22). Connor et al.’s (2016, p. 467) health frame states that cleaner air will be 
healthier, and less infectious diseases will spread (Connor et al., 2016, p. 467). 
Research has shown that a health frame can be successful (Maibach, Nisbet, Baldwin, 
Akerlof & Diao, 2010). Maibach et al. found that skeptic groups, who read a health 
frame of climate change, judge that information as compelling and useful (Maibach et 
al., 2010, p. 8). Similarly, Myers et al. showed that people of all segments got hope 
from the health frame (2012, p. 1110) and acknowledged its potential to engage 
people (2012, p. 1111). Whitmarsh (2008) combined the aspect of direct experience 
and health, and found that people whose health had been affected by air pollution are 
more convinced about climate change's risks and are more pessimistic about its 
consequences (Whitmarsh, 2008, p. 368). 
 The national security frame is tested by Myers et al. (2012), and highlighted 
climate change's risks to U.S. national security and benefits for U.S. national security 
of adaptation and mitigation (2012, pp. 1107-1108). This frame sparked a lot of anger 
within the skeptical groups. The effect of this anger on climate action is not clear-cut. 
Myers et al. (2012) state that anger within the groups aware of climate change, 
probably leads to action consistent with adaptation and mitigation. Conversely, for 
people skeptic about anthropogenic climate change, anger probably leads to action 
inconsistent with adaption and mitigation. Therefore, the high amount of anger within 
the denier-groups is probably an undesirable effect of the frame (2012, p. 1109). Their 
research shows that the security frame does not necessarily increase climate 
engagement, even adverse effects can occur (2012, p. 1109). 
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  Many other frames have been investigated, such as the catastrophe, 
accountability, competence and morality frames (Nisbet, 2012). The catastrophe 
frame starts from an environmental angle but emphasizes the visual and dramatic 
effects. Al Gore's (2016) An Inconvenient Truth is the obvious example, and portrays 
climate change as an "environmental Frankenstein Monster". Problematic 
consequences are increased polarization, resistance and hopelessness. The 
accountability frame emphasizes importance of expert understanding and protecting it 
from being obscured by politics (Nisbet, 2009, pp. 19-20). The accountability frame 
has similarities with Connor at al.’s (2016, p. 467) competence frame, which frames 
addressing climate change as learning new skills to solve societal problems and 
advancing scientific knowledge. The morality and ethics frame, as well as the 
religious, emphasizes respect for the earth and living creatures (Nisbet, 2009, p. 21). 
A major example took place in June 2015, when Pope Francis expressed the need to 
address climate change and perceive it like a moral imperative (Li, 2016). 
 
Risks of frames  
According to Lecheler and de Vreese, the intention of a frame is to create belief in the 
content and importance of the issue (2012). Although climate frames might appear as 
the ultimate way to engage people with climate change, undesired consequences can 
occur. Several researchers detected the “boomerang-effect”-risk, which occurs when 
climate frames result in negative feelings and reduced support for climate policy (Hart 
& Nisbet, 2012; Zhou, 2016).  
  Myers et al.'s results illustrate this (2012, p. 1107). Their national security 
frame resulted in increased anger and chance of behavior countering mitigation and 
adaptation amongst climate skeptics (2012, p. 1109). It should be kept in mind that 
this effect is not likely to take place in all circumstances. Besides the fact that it is 
U.S. research, there are many different ways to link national security to climate 
change. The part of their frame that was showed consists of quite formal language and 
seems without a particular partisan view (Myers et al., 2012, p. 1111). According to 
Chong and Druckman however, strong frames include links to partisanship and 
ideology (2007, p. 111). The security frame of this research will be different from the 
frame of Myers et al.. Language and content will be slightly right-wing with regard to 
the salient issue immigration, underpinned with the security-authority Middendorp.  
 Another “boomerang-effect” can take place for catastrophic frames, which can 
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result in less concern and more hopelessness (Myers et al., 2012, p. 1107). Even 
solely stating that climate change is happening, can spark negative emotions amongst 
climate skeptics. This counter-response is likely to occur for the catastrophic frame, 
as the position is extremely far from a skeptics’ worldview. Therefore, the challenge 
while phrasing a compelling climate change message is to be convincing about the 
urgency, while avoiding portraying it as an unstoppable terrible disaster. For this 
research, the introductions of the frames consist of general compelling information 
about anthropogenic climate change. 
 While framing climate change, two negative emotions should be avoided: 
hopelessness and inefficiency. Inefficiency is the belief that an individual does not 
have the capacity to implement a proposed response to a threat, and that the 
recommended action cannot effectively mitigate the threat (Myers et al., p. 1107). 
Myers et al. showed that those two negative emotions correlate with ignoring climate 
change and rationalizing non-action. Consequently, strong climate frames should 
create hope, as well as the idea that something can be done about it. A way to do this 
is using success stories and easy beneficial solutions. 
 
Inspiration for frames: what areas are salient to Dutch citizens? 
It order to increase interest of Dutch citizens for climate change, frames should link to 
areas that appeal to them. Recent national survey research shows what areas are 
salient to Dutch citizens (SCP, 2016). As mentioned, one question was what should 
be done with government expenses for 17 areas. Four areas people think most money 
should be spend on are health; jobs; fighting poverty in the Netherlands and education 
(SCP, 2016, p. 15). Another question showed that people are concerned about 
healthcare and economy (SCP, 2016, p. 16). Potential links between these issues and 
climate change, are negative health implications of polluted air, and creating new 
sustainable jobs, which could in turn help tackling poverty amongst Dutch citizens. 
 Another salient area for citizens is immigration and integration, as many 
citizens feel very negative, angry, or ashamed about this issue of Dutch society (SCP, 
2016, p. 16). Since 2015, immigration and integration is perceived as the biggest 
national problem (SCP, 2016, p. 16). Therefore, this issue could raise interest for 
climate change. There is much evidence for the link between climate change and 
security issues, like conflicts and migration flows (Ministry of Defense, 2016; Smith 
& Vivenkananda, 2007; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Hsiang, Burke & Miguel, 2013). 
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Researchers investigated the relationship between climate change and refugees, and 
found several cases where environmental change indirectly sparked forced migration 
(Gleditsch, Nordas & Saleyan, 2007; Boano, Zetter & Morris, 2008). Mainstream 
media like NOS and BBC discussed the link as well, with terms like “climate 
refugees/migrants” (NOS, 2016; Barnes, 2013). The combination of a growing 
concern for the issue of migration, as well as growing attention for the link between 
climate change and migration, suggests framing could engage people with the climate.  
 
From literature review to hypotheses 
As Dutch people consider health, economy and immigration, as salient, these areas 
will be linked with climate change. The first hypothesis (H1) is that reading one of the 
three frames will increase an individual's support to fight climate change. 
Additionally, it will be tested whether other personal characteristics (gender, age, 
level of education and religiousness) significantly affect someone's position towards 
climate change.  
  The second hypothesis (H2) is that, regardless of frames, right-wing people 
are less pro-climate than left-wing people. As the left-right divide section concluded, 
opinions about the importance of climate change considerably differ for people with 
different political preferences (SCP, 2016, p. 30). This research expects similar 
results.  
  The third hypothesis (H3) is that the effects of the climate frames differ for 
people with different political ideologies. It is expected that the generated effects of 
the frames on the climate attitudes, will change after controlling for the variable 
political ideology. More specifically, it is expected that the messages generally have a 
bigger impact on right-wing people, as their initial attitude is less supportive and more 
growth is possible. Besides, previous research has found bigger effects of climate 
frames on right-wing people’s attitudes, than for left-wing persons (Hardist, Johnson 
& Weber, 2010).4 
  Additionally, it is expected that frames work better if respondents perceive 
that particular area as important. It will be tested whether there is an interaction effect 
between importance ratings of areas and effects of frames.  
                                                 
4
Research in the U.S. found that the opinion of Republicans of climate change shifted more, after being 
exposed to an pro-environment frame, than it shifted for Democrats (Hardist, Johnson & Weber, 2010). 
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Section three: methodological approach 
 
General Research Design 
In order to investigate whether the frames have effect, an experimental survey was 
conducted and participants were randomly assigned to four different conditions. The 
full survey and frames are attached in the appendix. The four messages were written 
in online newspaper-article form. The three experimental groups received the pro-
environment national-benefit frames: immigration/security, economy and health. In 
order to assure general understanding about climate change, all frames stared with an 
identical introduction on the issue. The control group received an unrelated article, 
about the Brexit. The survey was created by using Qualtrics.  
 
Participants 
The survey-link was spread through the social network of the researcher, with the 
request to fill it in and announcement that three bol.com gift-card would be raffled. A 
limitation is that many people in the social network of the researcher are young, high-
educated, of rather left-wing ideology, and live in the same cities. Further, people who 
know the researcher might be aware of her interest in climate change. It was tried to 
overcome these limitation by attempting to reach people beyond the researcher's 
direct social network. The main way was the snowball method, as social contacts 
were asked to share the survey with people they knew, preferably with different 
personal characteristics. Furthermore, the researcher joined Facebook groups and 
asked Facebook-users to participate. An advantage was that it offered access to places 
with people that would otherwise not be reached. However, it was difficult to 
persuade these people to participate, so the amount of people with (extreme) right-
wing political party-preference is limited. 
 
Sample: distributions of characteristics 
Of the 137 respondents, 30% were male and 70% female. The age ranged from 17 to 
86 (average= 35). Most people were from Leiden (33,6%), Utrecht (15,4%), 
Amsterdam (7,3%), Breda (5%), and Leidschendam (4,4%). Most people went to 
university (56,2%), followed by HBO (19%), MBO (8%), havo (6,6%) and post-
academic (4,4%). A new variable was created to distinguish between high- (83,2%) 
and low education (16,8%), where havo is counted as low, since most havo-people 
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were 50+. Each frame group consisted of between 33 and 36 participants. The survey 
included questions after the article to measured how well participants understood the 
news articles, with results indicating they understood the content very well. 
 
Content of the frames 
All frames were written in clear and understandable language, with the attempt to 
convince the reader to the urgency of addressing climate change. The messages were 
as similar as possible, with regards to length, structure, layout, and balance between 
problems and solutions.5 Slightly different was the focus on important actors for 
addressing climate change. The security frames focused on the government. The 
economy article too, but also on multinationals. The main focus of the health frame is 
individual behavior. This section briefly explains the maintained sources and content 
of the frames. 
 The introduction consisted comprehensible information about climate change.6 
The security frame was structured around security authority Tom Middendorp's 
speeches (Ministry of Defense, 2016).7 The language is slightly political, in order to 
appeal to people that specifically care about security. It consists the idea of limiting 
immigration flows by limiting global warming. It accused politicians of only seeking 
short-time gain, which could be considered slightly populist. Combining the idea of 
limiting immigration with climate action has the potential to engage people who do 
not care about the environment yet, especially those with a right-wing position on 
                                                 
5
 All frames consisted of around 416 words and four paragraphs. They all started with an identical 
climate change introduction, and included one picture related to the particular area of the frame. With 
regards to the content, the messages paid a similar amount of attention to the problem an d to solutions. 
6
 Basic knowledge about the working of climate change came from reliable sources (IPCC, 2014, 
World Bank, 2014).The number of 70 billion animals annually is used by the institution Compassion in 
World Farming (2013) and Oppenlader (2013), who base this on statistics by Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
7
 Extensive research was done to the Tom Middendorp’s position on climate change. His full speech 
was analyzed, and because of limited word amount only the most relevant  arguments were used in the 
frames (Ministry of Defense, 2016). Further, to develop a clear understanding of Middendorp’s vision, 
his contribution to the Halifax Security Forum in Canada was scrutinized (Halifax Security Forum, 
2016). This conference was prior to his speech in The Hague, included a debate with Middendorp and 
other experts, about climate change in the domain of security and defense (Halifax Security Forum, 
2016). Middendorp’s arguments about the security risks of climate change are supported  by various 
findings (Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Smith & Vivenkanada, 2007). The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (2015) estimated that climate change will be the cause of millions of 
refugees. Although it is a complex issue, many academics and policymakers have argued that climate 
change will lead to mass migration (Salehyan, 2008, p. 315). Links between climate change and 
conflict are present, as quantitative analysis of 60 studies found a strong causal relationship between 
climate change and human conflict (Hsiang, Burke & Miguel, 2013).  
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immigration.8  
 The economy frame emphasized that the green energy transition is an 
economic opportunity the Netherlands should not miss, which offers the opportunity 
to create green jobs (Wheeler & Beatley, 2014). It discussed a letter of 90 university 
professors about the necessity of mitigation (Trouw, 2017). Also, a rather right-wing 
argument is made about the importation of fossil fuels, as it is stated that this is 
contrary to our national benefit.9 Furthermore, it included Groningen Seaports 
Director Harm Post’s statement that multinationals “cannot survive without thinking 
green” (NOS, 2017a).10 
 The health frame is mainly build on health risks of air pollution and micro-
dusk, such as long and heart diseases (Knol, 2014). It is argued that fighting climate 
change benefits our health, as the quality of the air would improve.11 This message 
did not include explicit right-wing language, as the options for it were less evident. 
 The control group received a news message about the EU and the Brexit. It 
talked about how the EU is addressing the Brexit, and the differences between the 
levels of strictness members want to maintain (van Slooten, 2017).  
 
Procedure 
Before showing respondents the article, general information like gender, age, place of 
residence, and level of education was asked. Other characteristics were asked after the 
                                                 
8
 The SCP survey research showed that PVV-voters wanted to cut most on climate policy (SCP, 2016, 
p. 30). On a scale from -100 to 100, the average judgement of PVV-voters about what should be done 
with government spending on fighting climate change, was minus 31 (SCP, 2016, p. 30). The political 
party PVV is known for its extreme right-wing position on immigration, as they emphasize the need to 
limit immigration (Moerman, 2017). Limiting immigration is important to many Dutch citizens (SCP, 
2016), and linking this goal with climate action might therefore offer possibilities to raise interest. 
9
  It is argued that importing oil from foreign countries is against the Dutch national interest. Other 
countries make money out of it, which they can use to develop their own country. It is stated that 
investing in the own Dutch economy is would benefit this country and its citizens. This is considered as 
a rather right-wing argument, as main-stream media (NOS, 2017c) states that left-wing tends to have 
an international-solidarity, whereas right-wing politics rather has a national-solidarity. 
10
 In an interview with NOS (2017a), Harm post gave several arguments that supported the transition to 
green energy, be emphasizing benefits for multinationals and the economy. Those statements are used 
to demonstrate the overall argument of the frame that addressing climate change benefits the economy.  
11
 Information by Milieudefensie (translation: Friends of the Earth Netherlands) was used in order to 
detect the health risks of climate change (Knol, 2013). Further, it was argued that cycling more often 
and eating less meat would benefit our health, as well as the environment. A risk of using the “eat less 
meat” argument, could be sparking a counter-response, as was perceived in the study of Maibach et al. 
(2010, p. 9). Still, this argument is included, due to the major effect on the environment (Oppenlader, 
2013), and health risks like increased of eating meat, like increased chance on coronary heart disease 
and diabetes mellitus (Micha, Wallace, Mozaffarian, 2010). 
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article, in order to avoid a priming-effect.12 They then got the announcement that they 
had to read an article, followed by the article itself. Measures were undertaken to 
make sure they absorbed the information of the message.13  
 Afterwards, the respondent's "climate attitude" was measured. Also, 
respondents were asked how important they judged security, economy and health. 
Other aspects that were asked were religiousness, political party preference and left-
right self-placement (0-100). The survey concluded by thanking respondents, offering 
the opportunity to win a gift-card, and attaching the researchers’ contact information. 
 
Operationalization: indicators measuring attitudes on climate change  
The indicators used by McCright et al. were used to measure the climate attitude 
(McCright et al., 2016, 346). Participants had to indicate to what extent they agreed 
upon five separate statements, with options ranging between 1 (totally disagree) and 7 
(totally agree). They had to choose their attitudes for the following statements: 
"Human caused climate change is occurring", "Climate change is serious", 
"Governments, corporations, industries and citizens should contribute to fighting 
climate change", "I would be willing spend money, time and energy to contribute to 
fighting climate change", and "I support policies to reduce greenhouse gasses". 
Consequently, five climate attitude indicators were created: 'acceptance of 
anthropogenic climate change'; 'perceived seriousness of climate change'; 'mitigation 
by actors'; 'personal willingness to fight climate change'; and 'support for policies to 
reduce greenhouse gasses', with scores ranging between 1 and 7. 
 
The climate indicators – combining into a general climate attitude variable 
In order to research the “climate attitude” in general, the five indicators were 
combined into a new variable (referred to as “general climate attitude”), which 
                                                 
12
 Priming is defined as the process where certain issues are made more salient than others, which 
influences the way in which an issue is judged (Wang, 2007, p. 124). In this context, it would mean  
that if the survey would include all kind of questions before reading the frame, they would probably 
interpret it differently than when they would immediately read the frame. More specifically, asking 
respondents about political preferences and other dispositions, could make them extra aware of their 
values and perhaps less open for new information.  
13
 The announcement before the article emphazised that it was important for the sake of the research 
that they would read it carefully. A Qualtrics-technique was used which enabled respondents to mark 
words in the article, which they were told to do. This was done to make sure they would read it, and 
help them understand the content. Afterwards, questions were asked about to what extent they 
understood the article. They also had to summarize the content in one or two sentences. Results showed 
that those measures  worked, as they understood the content very well.  
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consists of the mean attitudes on the five items. A reliability analysis was run to check 
whether the internal validity of the five variables was sufficient. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha was 0.927, which means the reliability is very high and combining the 
variables is statistically justified.14 Both the five indicators, and the general climate 
attitude, will be used in the analysis.  
 
Section four: data analysis 
The following hypotheses will be tested in this section: 
H1: Reading one of the national benefit pro-environment frames increases an 
individual’s support for fighting climate change.  
H2: Right-wing people are less supportive of fighting climate change than left-wing 
people. 
H3: The effects of the frames on climate attitudes are different for people with 
different political ideologies: effects on right-wing people will be bigger. 
  This paragraph is followed by table one, which represents relevant results of 
regression analyses that were run. Subsequently, H1 will be discussed by interpreting 
table two, which visualizes differences between climate attitudes of the frame groups. 
This is followed by a justification and explanation of the statistical tests, interpretation 
of relevant results, and conclusion. Additionally, the effect of education on climate 
attitudes is explained briefly. H2 and H3 will be answered similarly: visualization 
(table three and four), statistics, interpretation and conclusion. Supplementary, the last 
paragraph reports about a whether there is an interaction between importance ratings 
of areas (security, economy, health), and successfulness of frames about these areas. 
  All data of relevant regression analyses that were run are combined into table 
one. The first section of that table represents the effects of the dichotomous frame 
variables on the climate attitudes (H1). The second section shows the effect of 
political ideology (left-right, 0-100) on the climate indicators  (H2), followed by the 
coefficients of the interaction variables (H3). Additionally, the effect of education on 
the climate attitudes is reported.  
                                                 
14
 The score on a Cronbach’s Alpha test can be between 0 and 1, and should be at least 0.7 in order to 
combine variables into a meaningful new variable. 
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 Table 1. Results regression analyses - effects on climate attitudes 
Note: 
+
p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
  Item 1: 
Climate 
change is 
human 
caused 
Item 2: 
Serious-
ness 
problem 
Item 3: 
Miti-
gation by 
actors 
Item 4: 
Willing-
ness to 
contri-
bute 
Item 5: 
Support 
climate 
policy 
Item 6:  
General 
climate 
attitude 
Frame effects 
(H1) 
Constant 
(control group) 
(N=36) 
5.444***  
(.246) 
5.639***  
(.267) 
5.500*** 
(.280) 
4.722***  
(.243) 
5.306***  
(.248) 
5.322*** 
(.226) 
Security (0/1) 
(N=34) 
.379  
(.353) 
.420  
(.384) 
.559  
(.401) 
.866*  
(.348) 
.694
+
  
(.356) 
.584
+
 
(.325) 
Economy (0/1) 
Frame (N=34) 
.232  
(.353) 
.302  
(.384) 
.676
+
   
(.401) 
.513  
(.348) 
.371  
(.356) 
.419  
(.325) 
Health (0/1)  
(N=33) 
.253  
(.356) 
.361  
(.386) 
.318  
(4.05) 
.520  
(.351) 
.210  
(.359) 
.332  
(.317) 
Political 
ideology: 
left-right (0-
100) (H2) 
Constant (0= 
extreme left) 
5.923***  
(.267) 
6.079***  
(.291) 
6.062*** 
(.307) 
5.864***  
(.261) 
6.028***  
(.271) 
5.991*** 
(.246) 
Left-Right 
ideology (0-100) 
-.006  
(.005) 
-.004  
(.006) 
-.004  
(.006) 
-.015**  
(.005) 
-.009
+
  
(.005) 
-.008  
(.005) 
Interaction 
effect effects 
frames and 
political 
ideology 
(H3) 
Constant  5.853***  
(.518) 
5.775*** 
(.566) 
5.968***  
(.590) 
5.054*** 
(.496) 
5.442*** 
(.520) 
5.619***  
(.475) 
Security Frame .506  
(.727) 
.631  
(.794) 
.434  
(.829) 
1.096  
(.696) 
1.018  
(.730) 
.737  
(.668) 
Economy Frame -.260  
(.768) 
.250  
(.839) 
.087  
(.876) 
1.388
+
  
(.736) 
.896  
(.771) 
.472  
(.705) 
Health frame  -.131  
(.799) 
.218  
(.873) 
-.258  
(.911) 
.813  
(.765) 
.497  
(.802) 
.228  
(.733) 
Political 
Ideology (0-100) 
-.009  
(.010) 
-.003  
(.011) 
-.010  
(.011) 
-.007  
(.009) 
-.003  
(.010) 
-.006 
(.009) 
Security* 
Ideology(0-100) 
-.003  
(.014) 
-.005  
(.015) 
.002  
(.016) 
-.006  
(.013) 
-.008  
(.014) 
-.004  
(.013) 
Economy* 
Ideology(0-100) 
.011  
(.014) 
.001  
(.016) 
.013  
(.016) 
-.018  
(.014) 
-.011  
(.015) 
-.001  
(.013) 
Health* 
Ideology(0-100) 
.008  
(.017) 
.003  
(.018) 
.013  
(.019) 
-.008  
(.016) 
-.007  
(.017) 
.002  
(.015) 
Effect of 
education 
(0=low, 
1=high) 
Constant (low 
education level) 
5.174*** 
(.304) 
5.261*** 
(.328) 
5.391***  
(.349) 
4.478***  
(.301) 
5.261***  
(.311) 
5.113*** 
(.280) 
High level of 
education 
.580+  
(.333) 
.774*  
(.360) 
.591  
(.382) 
.855*  
(.330) 
.432  
(.341) 
.647* 
(.307) 
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H1 - Visualization of differences in climate attitudes between frame groups  
It was expected that giving Dutch people a national interest frame, would increase 
their climate attitudes. Table two compares mean scores on the six climate attitude 
indicators, between the four frame groups. Results show that respondents are 
generally rather aware of climate change, and willing to fight it.15 Nevertheless, the 
control group has the lowest support for each item. This suggests that the expectation 
is met, as receiving a national benefit frame generally results in more awareness and 
concern about anthropogenic global warming, as well as support for mitigation and 
willingness to contribute to this.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 All means are higher than 5 (“rather agree”), except for the score of the control group on their 
willingness to contribute to fighting climate change, which was 4.72. It should be kep t in mind that 
general results are influenced by the nature of the social network of the researcher. 
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H1 - Differences in attitudes between frame-groups: statistical test 
For this research, regression analyses were used to find effects of independent 
variables on a dependent scale variable. In order to test H1, it was investigated 
whether the six climate attitudes of the groups differed in a significant way (first 
section of table 1). The three frame groups are dichotomous dummy variables, and 
unstandardized coefficients (B, Std. Error) show how much should be added to the 
constant (control group’s mean attitude), to get the mean climate attitude of that 
particular frame group. This test was run for each different climate attitude measure 
separately. Relations are considered as statistically significant if p>.05.16  
 
H1 - Interpretation results 
For all indicators, the constant shows the control group’s mean support for the item. 
As all unstandardized regression coefficients are positive, receiving a frame 
consistently increases a person’s climate attitude. Most effects are not statistically 
significant, which is not surprising.17 Although there are no statistically significant 
impacts on indicator one and two, coefficients suggest that the sequence of 
successfulness of frames is: security, economy, health. This is different for the 
suggested sequences of indicator three (economy, security, health), four (security, 
health, economy), and five and six (security, economy, health). One coefficient is 
statically significant: the effect of the security frame on an individual’s willingness to 
contribute money, time and energy to fighting climate change (B=.866, p=.014). 
Three other relations have chance between 5% and 10% to take place by coincidence: 
the effect of the economy frame on perceived need for actors to mitigate (B=.676, 
p=.094), the effect of the security frame on support for climate policy (B=.694, 
p=.053) and on the general climate attitude (B=.584, p=.074).  
 
Conclusion H1: “National benefit frame increases engagement climate change” 
All positive B’s in the first six tables of this section indicate that the frames 
consistently increase the climate attitude. However, most effects are not significant, 
                                                 
16
 If the level of significance is below .05, the chance that the relation occurs coincidentally is below 
5%, and it is statistically accepted that the relationship takes place. 
17
 This is likely to be due to the limited sample size, which results in a too big chance that the causal 
relation might occur coincidentally. An outcome that is not significant is very likely with a relatively 
small N like in this research. Furthermore, the social network of the researcher is likely to be more 
engaged with the issue of climate change than the national Dutch population, which means that average 
attitudes are potentially relatively high, and there is less room for increase on attitudes. 
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except for the effect of the security article on person’s willingness to contribute to 
fighting climate change. This effect proofs that the national security article has the 
potential to engage people with the issue. It successfully mobilizes people to act in a 
more sustainable way, or at least increases their intention to do so. Their support for 
the item on a 1-7 scale increases with almost one, after reading the security article. 
 Generally, the security article is most successful, followed by economy and 
health. However, when distinguishing for the five indicators, it was clear that the 
sequence of successfulness differs. This suggests that, while attempting to influence 
public opinion on climate change, there should be a clear goal about what exactly one 
wants to influence, because different frames work to influence different aspects of 
climate attitude.  
 
Additional: Effect of education on a person’s climate attitude 
Additionally, regression analyses were run to investigate whether other 
characteristics, gender, religion, age and education, influenced a person’s climate 
attitude. None of the relations were strong or significant, except for the dichotomous 
variable level of education.18 
 
H2 – “Right-wing is less pro-climate”: visualization  
The second hypothesis states that right-wing people are generally less engaged with 
the issue of climate change, and therefore score lower on the indicators. A 100-point 
scale measured the left-right self-placement (0-49= left-wing, N=76; 50=center, 
N=14; 51-100= right-wing, N=49). Table three compares average attitudes of those 
three political groups, on each indicator.19 
                                                 
18
 A higher education results in a more support for climate change action. For the general climate 
attitude, this effect is statistically significant (p=0.037). The constant, so the mean attitude for people 
with a low education, is 5.113. If a person has a high education, the average increase in a person’s 
attitude is 0.647. Other two statistically significant effects are the impact of high education on a 
person’s willingness to contribute to fighting climate change (B=.855, p=.011) and on their perce ived 
seriousness of the problem (B=.774, p=.033). The results are included at the end of table one. 
19
 This variable was only used to visualize the data in table 3 and table 4. For the rest of the research, 
the 0-100 scale variable political ideology was used, because otherwise information would be lost. 
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H2 – Statistics, interpretation and conclusion 
  To investigate whether the effect of political ideology on a person’s climate 
attitude was statistically significant, the scale-variable (0-100, extreme left-extreme 
right) was used as an independent variable in a regression analysis. The coefficients 
for each indicator are negative, suggesting that the more right-wing a person is, the 
less likely the person is to care about climate change.  
  Almost none of these relations were significant.20 However, there is one 
exception: an individual’s willingness to contribute money, time and energy to 
fighting climate change decreases significantly (B=.015, p=0.004) as a person has a 
more right-wing self-placement. Theoretically, an extreme-right person (=100), would 
score 1.5 points lower on the 7-point indicator than an extreme left-wing person (=0). 
                                                 
20
 The p’s for indicator one to six were respectively p=.261, p=.501, p=.510, p=.004, p=.091, p=.120. 
This shows that there are big differences between the chances that political ideology has an effect on a 
certain aspect (indicator) that represents the climate attitude. The chance that the effect of the security 
article impacts the willingness to contribute is 99,6%. This is a big difference with the p’s on the other 
indicators. This reaffirms the notion that there are different aspects of the climate attitude, and 
distinguishing between them is important. 
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Another effect, relatively close to statistically significant, is between political 
ideology and support for climate policy (B=.009, p=.091). 
  The hypothesis was that, compared with left-wing, right-wing people score 
lower on the climate attitude indicators. Results found some evidence for this, since 
right-wing people are less willing to personally contribute to fighting climate change. 
 
H3 - Visualizing different frame-effects per political ideology group 
The main expectation of H3 was that frames would have different effects on people 
with different ideologies. Specifically, the frames were expected to spark a bigger 
increase in climate attitude amongst right-wing people. Table four visualizes the 
effects of frames on the general climate attitude, while distinguishing between the 
three ideology groups. A comparison of the means shows that the right-wing group 
consistently has a lower general climate attitude than the left-wing group.21 Per 
political group, distances between the four frame group’s means are not entirely the 
same, suggesting that frames might not have the same effect on each political 
ideology group. An interaction effect would mean that the effect of a frame on an 
attitude is not the same for each political ideology, and vice versa.22 
 
                                                 
21
 In order to calculate the mean general climate attitudes for each frame group, while distinguishing 
between the three ideology groups, twelve new variables were created. Those dichotomous dummy 
variables represented the cases that were in a particular frame group and ideology group. The mean 
scores of those groups and their N’s were as follows. Control group: left -wing (mean=5.529, N=17), 
center (mean=5.120, N=5) and right-wing (mean=5.143, N=14). Security group: left-wing 
(mean=5.970, N=20), center (mean=6.267, N=3) and right-wing (mean=5.691, N=11). Economy 
group: left-wing (mean=5.706, N=17), center (mean=6.333, N=3) and right-wing (mean=5.657, N=14). 
Heath group: left-wing (mean=5.736, N=22), center (mean=6.000, N=3) and right-wing (mean=5.300, 
N=8). The mean of the total sample (N=137) is 5.651. 
22
 To illustrate what an interaction effect would mean, three examples of potential interaction effects 
are discussed briefly (based on interpreting table four). Firstly, the health article is on average slightly 
more persuasive than the economy article for left-wing people, while the center- and right-wing group 
is more convinced by the economy- article than the health article. Secondly, while comparing between 
ideology groups, the center-group has the biggest difference between the control group’s score, and the 
frame groups. This suggests that the frames have a bigger impact on the attitude of someone with a 
center ideology. It should be noted however, that the center group consists only of 14 persons, 5 were 
in the control group, and 3 in each of the frame groups. This makes the chance that this effect is taking 
place per coincidence very high. Thirdly, when reviewing the left-wing group in the plot, the difference 
in attitude between the control- and economy group is not at all as big as within the right-wing group. 
This is an indication that the economy article might work better to persuade right -wing people. 
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H3 - Statistical test to research differences in frame-effects between different 
ideologies 
To answer H3, political ideology (0-100) was used as a control variable in the 
regression analysis. In a regression model with solely the frames as independent 
variables, it is assumed that the effect of the frames are the same for people with 
different ideologies. As this is expected not to be the case, political ideology is 
included as a control variable. In general, including a control variable could have an 
additive effect, quantitative interaction effect (only magnitude of relation differs) or a 
qualitative interaction effect (both the magnitude and direction of effect differ).23 To 
                                                 
23
 In general, if a third variable is included in a model to research whether a relationship changes after 
correcting for it, certain findings are possible. Firstly, an additive effect could occur. For example 
(fictional), if for the climate attitude of a left-wing person would increase from 5 to 6 after having read 
the security article, while for a right-wing person the increase would be from 4 to 5. In that case, using 
the third variable political ideology does not change the magnitude neither the direction of the relation 
between frame and attitude. However, if an interaction effect would take place, including the variable 
political ideology would show that the increase sparked by the frame differs as political ideology 
differs. Two types of interaction effects could occur: quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative means 
that the magnitude of the relationship differs, but the direction, either positive or negative, stays the 
same. (A fictional example would be that the economy frame increases a left -wing person’s position 
with .6, while it would increase a right-wing person’s attitude with 1.) A qualitative interaction means 
that not only the magnitude is different, but also the direction differs, if the interaction variable is 
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conduct this regression analysis, three new interaction variables were created 
(multipliers of each separate dummy and political ideology scale), with scores 
between 0 and 100. The regression was run for each of the six climate indicators, 
including seven independent variables: dummy variables of the three frames; the 
political ideology scale; and the three interaction variables. 
 
H3 – Interpretation results  
The third section of table one includes the unstandardized coefficient per interaction 
variable, which represents the effect of political ideology within that particular frame 
group. None of the coefficients are significant, which means that this research does 
not find support the expectation that the effects of the frames differ per political 
ideology (H3). Chances are high that the effects (coefficients) are taking place 
coincidentally.24 Still, an interpretation will follow, to analyze results and explore 
potential effects that might serve as inspiration for future research. 
  Per climate item, the three interaction-coefficients should be compared, while 
keeping in mind the results from both section one (effects of frames on support) and 
two (effects of political ideology on support).25 If the coefficient of an interaction 
variable is negative, this indicates that the frame works better to persuade left wing 
people for the item. An example is the coefficient of Security*Ideology on item one 
(B=-.003), which would theoretically mean that within the security group, an extreme 
left-wing person (ideology=0) would have an attitude of 5.853 (constant), while an 
extreme right-wing person (ideology=100) would have an attitude of 5.553 (constant-
.300). If a coefficient is positive, this indicates that the frame is more successful in 
increasing a right-wing person’s attitude. For instance, the effect of 
Economy*Ideology on item one (B=.011) suggests that within the economy group, an 
                                                                                                                                           
included in the analysis. (Imaginary, this would be the case if the health article would decrease the 
attitude of a right-wing person from 5 to 4.5, while it would increase the attitude of a left -wing person 
from 5 to 6.) 
24
 This research works with N=137, which is actually insufficient to effectively investigate the effect of 
a control variable like was done in this analysis. For the N’s per political group per frame, see footnote 
22. Due to the limited sample size, it is not surprising that no significant interaction effects were found. 
25
 It gives insight to compare the coefficients of political ideology on a climate indicator (in section two 
of the table) with the coefficients of the interaction variables. This shows in which way the effect of 
ideology on support for the item is changed, if a person is part of a particular frame group. While doing 
this, comparisons suggest that, if the three frame dummies are perceived as interaction variables, 
qualitative interaction effects might take place, since the direction of the relationship changes in some 
cases after including the frames to the analysis . However, these effects are not significant, and this 
research regards political ideology as the control variable for the effects of frames, instead of the other 
way around. 
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extreme left-wing person would score 5.853, while an extreme right-wing person 
would score 6.900.26  
  The coefficients for indicator one (Security*Ideology: -.003, 
Ideology*Economy: .011, Health*Ideology: .008) suggest that the security article 
works best for left-wing people, while economy, followed by health, work better for 
right-wing people. The B’s for the second indicator (-.005, .001, .003) suggest that 
security is more successful amongst left-wing, while health and economy are more 
persuasive for right-wing. The three coefficients on indicator three (.002, .013, .013) 
suggest that all frames (especially economy and health) work better to convince right-
wing people of the necessity for actors to engage in mitigation. On the contrary, 
coefficients on both indicator four (-.006, -.018, -.008) and five (-.008, -.011, -.007) 
suggest that all frames, especially economy, work better to increase mobilization and 
support amongst left-wing people. The coefficients for the general climate attitude (-
.004, -.001, .002) suggest that overall, the security and economy frame work better for 
left-wing people, while the health frame works better for right-wing people.  
 
Conclusion H3: "Effects of frames differ per political ideology" 
The third hypothesis was that frame effects are influenced by political ideology, and 
that right-wing people’s attitudes would increase more. Table three suggested that 
including political ideology as control variable could alter the effects of frames on 
climate attitudes. However, the regression analyses with interaction variables included 
did not show any significant results. Still, the directions did suggest that some 
messages work better to engage left- or right-wing people. For example, in the section 
about H1 ("receiving a frame increases the climate attitude"), it was concluded that 
the sequence of successful frames was: security, economy, health. This changed after 
including the interaction variable. Generally, the health article works best to increase 
a right-wing person's general climate attitude, which is in line with the expected 
direction of the interaction effect. On the contrary, the security-, followed by 
economy frame, work better to increase a left-wing person's attitude. Distinguishing 
between ideologies gave further insights and nuances. 
  The conclusion on H1 argued that different frames are likely to influence 
                                                 
26
 This seems very high, but it should be kept in mind that this is purely theoretical. Not many 
respondents were extreme right-wing, the B shows the slope of the graph, and this effect is not 
significant.  
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different aspects of public climate attitude. Although none of the results for H3 are 
statistically significant, directions of coefficients reaffirm this notion. For indicator 
four and five, all frames worked better for left-wing, while for indicator three, they all 
worked better for right-wing. This shows that it matters what indicators are used to 
measure the climate attitude, as coefficients for item four and five show the exact 
opposite of what was expected, while results for item three are in line with the 
expectation that frames work better to influence right-wing people. For the other 
indicators, particular messages worked better for each political ideology. This shows 
that although “general climate attitude” is a very reliable combined variable, 
distinguishing between different aspects of climate attitude is useful. 
 
Additional: Interaction between concern for frame’s area and effect of frame 
Additionally, it was tested whether there was an interaction effect between the 
perceived importance of an area (security, economy, health), and the successfulness 
of a frame about that particular area. It was expected that the more important a person 
perceives an issue, the more successful the frame about that area would be, in 
increasing that person’s climate attitude.  
  The structure of investigating this is similar to testing H3. The perceived 
importance (1=very important, 7=very unimportant) functioned as control variable. 
Six regression analyses (with the six climate attitude items as DV’s) were run for each 
of the frame areas. For example for security, the IV’s were: the dummy frame 
variables, perceived importance security, SecurityDummy*ImportanceSecurity, 
EconomyDummy*ImportanceSecurity, HealthDummy*Importancehealth. It was 
expected that the coefficient of the interaction variable 
SecurityDummy*ImportanceSecurity would be negative and statistically significant, 
which would mean that a person who has read the frame and perceives security as 
very important, would score higher on the climate attitude item than a person who 
reads the frame and perceives the security as less important. However, none of the 18 
regression analyses showed a statistically significant effect, and often the expected 
directions were not present either.27 Therefore, results of these tests do not provide 
                                                 
27
 To maintain the focus of this research, results  were not included in table one. As said, no statistically 
significant interaction effects were found. Besides the limited sample size, the absence of much 
variation in how important people perceived issues, contribute to a lower chance on statistically 
significant results. Nevertheless, both the perceived importance of health and security, turned out to 
have a statistically significant effect on a person’s climate attitude. In order to  investigate those effects 
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support for the expectation that frames work better if persons rate the area of the 
frame as particularly important.  
Section five: Conclusion 
 
The broader relevance for this research is the global problem of climate change, the 
inaccurate public perception of the issue, and the political controversy around it. 
Generally, left-wing people show more support for fighting climate change than right-
wing people. The attempt of this research was to overcome that gap, and increase 
public engagement with the issue, by means of climate change communication. More 
specifically, three climate change frames that emphasized areas Dutch people care 
about, where tested in an experimental survey setting.  
 The first hypothesis was that national benefit pro-environment frames 
(security, economy, health) would increase public concern about climate change. 
Although most coefficients were not significant, directions showed that frames 
consistently increased support for the climate attitude indicators. Moreover, the 
research found a statistically significant effect: reading the security frame of climate 
change increased the individual willingness to contribute money, time and effort to 
fight climate change, with almost 1 at a 0-7 scale (B=0.866, p=.004). This shows that 
the security message has the potential to mobilize people to change their individual 
behavior, to act in a more sustainable way. Further, the sequence of effective frames 
on general climate attitude was: security, economy, health.  
  The second hypothesis was that right-wing people are initially less supportive 
of action to fight climate change than left-wing people. The consistent negative 
coefficients indicated that this is indeed the case. Moreover, the statistically 
significant effect of political ideology on a person’s willingness to contribute money, 
                                                                                                                                           
separately, regression analyses were run with the three variables about perceived importance of the 
issues (1-7) as independent variables , and general climate attitude as dependent variable. The effect of 
perceived importance of national security on the general climate attitude (item six) (B=.607, p=.001) 
showed that the less a person cares about national security, the more the person cares about the 
environment. The opposite counts for health, the less someone cares about health, the lower the score is 
on the general climate attitude (B=-.360, p=.043). (Note: as a person increases on the 1-7 perceived 
importance scale, the concern with the frame area decreases ). These outcomes are remarkable and 
should be topic of future research. Additionally, it was investigated whether there was an interaction 
effect between the position on the left-right (0-100) scale, and the perceived importance of an issue. 
This was done for each of the three areas, with general climate attitude as DV, and perceived 
importance, political ideology, perceived importance*ideology , being IV’s . No statistically significant 
results were found, so it does not proof that the effect of perceived importance on a person’s climate 
attitude, is influenced by a person’s left-right placement. 
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time and effort to fighting climate change (B=.015, p=0.004) offers some evidence for 
H2.  
 The third hypothesis was that the effect of the messages differed per political 
ideology, and right-wing would generally experience more growth in climate 
attitudes. Although the bar chart (table four) indicated that an interaction effect might 
be present, no statistically significant results were found to support H3. Nevertheless, 
magnitude and directions of the interaction variables’ coefficients indicated there 
could be differences in what kind of frames influence what kind of people. Generally, 
the health frame worked better to spark an increase in a right-wing person’s attitude, 
but the opposite applies for the security and economy frame. However, distinguishing 
between indicators suggested that all frames were more successful in making right-
wing persons believe that governments, corporations, industries and individuals 
should do more to increase climate change. 
 As the theoretical background section showed, this research was built on work 
of many academics in the field of climate change communication. The most important 
contribution of this research is the security frame’s effect on a person’s willingness to 
contribute. Results of this research bring up many relevant areas for future research. 
Detailed research could explore which particular security-frame aspects motivate 
people to change their behavior. Further, the frames should be tested in different 
environments and countries. With regards to the Netherlands, a national 
representative sample would overcome the limitation of N (size and diversity) of this 
research. In case the positive increase would stay (or be even bigger), far-reaching 
societal effects could be sparkled, regarding sustainability. Academics should further 
investigate which frames are successful for which ideology-groups. This research 
gives the impression that particular frames are more successful for particular political 
worldviews. A sophisticated use of frames is necessary in order to be individually 
effective.  
  The relevance of this research area goes beyond academics. In order for 
politicians and policymakers to understand the dynamics of public viewpoints 
towards climate change, knowledge about the different effects of climate frames on 
people with different ideologies is utmost relevant. Not only on the national level 
(decreasing the citizens-politics gap), also on the international level. Especially in the 
current political landscape, with an American President stepping out of the Paris 
Climate Agreements, effective international steps are more essential than ever. 
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Knowledge about creating public engagement with climate change could contribute to 
international agreement. It could enable future world leaders to spark international 
change, by creating blueprints to get the public to fight climate change. Here, this 
research attempts to serve as an inspiration, by illustrating how people can be 
stimulated to contribute money, time and effort to addressing the global challenge of 
climate change.  
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Appendix A : full survey text 
 
(Numbers of questions might seem illogical but do not affect the sequence as is 
presented in this appendix) 
 
Titel: Enquêteonderzoek scriptie 
 
Q1 Welkom, hartelijk dank voor het meewerken aan dit scriptie-onderzoek. Deze 
korte enquête (+/- 5 min.) bevat enkele vragen over u als persoon, maar zal volledig 
anoniem worden behandeld. Indien u kans wilt maken op een van de vier bol.com 
gift-cards, kunt u later uw e-mail adres invullen. Ook dan wordt strikt vertrouwelijk 
omgegaan met deze informatie. Het onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd door Tara Bary. 
 
Q2 Wat is uw geslacht? 
 Man (1) 
 Vrouw (2) 
 
Q4 Wat is uw leeftijd? (in jaren) 
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Q5 Wat is uw woonplaats? 
 
Q7 Wat is uw hoogst gevolgde opleiding? (Geldt ook voor opleidingen die u nog niet 
heeft afgerond maar wel van plan bent af te ronden)  
 Basisschool (1) 
 vmbo (2) 
 havo (3) 
 vwo of gymnasium (4) 
 mbo (5) 
 hbo (6) 
 universitair (7) 
 post-acedemisch (8) 
 
Q6 Op de volgende pagina krijgt u een nieuwsartikel te lezen. Deze is gebaseerd op 
recentelijk nieuws. Het is van belang dat u het artikel aandachtig leest, want erna 
zullen vragen volgen over het artikel. U kunt delen die u het meest belangrijk vindt 
markeren door erop te klikken. Er wordt gekeken welke delen u als belangrijk ervaart. 
 
Q26 Lees alstublieft het onderstaande artikel en markeer de gebieden waarin 
informatie staat die u het belangrijkst vindt. (Bron: NOS)  
 
(een van de vier artikelen, mogelijkheid tot markeren van zinsdelen.) 
 
 
Q13 Geef aan in hoeverre het volgende voor u van toepassing is (in schattig van 
percentages) 
______ Ik heb de inhoud van het artikel begrepen (1) 
______ Ik heb de stukken gemarkeerd waarvan ik denk dat ze het belangrijkst zijn (2) 
______ Ik zou iemand anders nu kunnen vertellen over de inhoud van het artikel (3) 
 
Q14 Kunt u in een of twee zinnen de kern van het artikel samenvatten? Denk hierbij 
niet te lang na, maar schrijf op wat in u opkomt. 
 
Q18 Geef aan hoe belangrijk u de volgende punten acht. "Belangrijk" betekent dat u 
vindt dat er veel aandacht voor moet zijn.  
 Heel 
belangrijk 
(1) 
Belangrijk 
(2) 
Een beetje 
belangrijk (3) 
Neutraal (4) Een beetje 
onbelangrijk (5) 
Onbelangrijk 
(6) 
Heel 
onbelangrijk (7) 
Nationale 
veiligheid (6) 
              
Gezondheid 
(2) 
              
Economie (3)               
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Q15 Geef aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de onderstaande beweringen. 
 Volledig 
mee oneens 
(1) 
Oneens 
(2) 
Beetje 
oneens (3) 
Neutraal (4) Beetje 
eens (5) 
Eens 
(6) 
Volledig 
mee eens 
(7) 
Klimaatverandering vindt plaats door 
menselijk handelen. (1) 
              
Klimaatverandering is een serieus probleem 
voor de mensheid. (2) 
              
Overheden, bedrijven, industrieën en 
individuen moeten bijdragen aan oplossingen 
om klimaatverandering tegen te gaan. (3) 
              
Ik ben bereid om geld, tijd en energie bij te 
dragen aan oplossingen om 
klimaatverandering tegen te gaan. (4) 
              
Ik ondersteun beleid om broeikasgas-
uitstoten zoals CO2 en methaan te 
verminderen. (5) 
              
 
 
Q20 Hoe belangrijk vindt u de rol van de volgende actoren in klimaatverandering 
tegengaan? Zet ze op volgorde van "belangrijkst" naar "minst belangrijk".  
______ Overheden (1) 
______ Bedrijven en Industrieën (2) 
______ Individuen (3) 
 
Q16 Bent u religieus? 
 Ja, ik ben actief gelovig (1) 
 Ja, maar ik doe niet veel met mijn religie (2) 
 Nee (3) 
 
Q17 Zou u uw eigen politieke ideologie eerder als links of als rechts beschouwen? 
Plaats uzelf op de onderstaande schaal. 0 staat voor zeer links, en 100 staat voor zeer 
rechts.  
______ Links - Rechts (1) 
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Q18 Welke politieke partij ligt het dichts bij uw eigen politieke overtuiging? 
 VVD (1) 
 PVV (2) 
 CDA (3) 
 D66 (4) 
 GroenLinks (5) 
 SP (6) 
 PvdA (7) 
 CU (8) 
 PvdD (9) 
 50+ (10) 
 DENK (11) 
 SGP (12) 
 FvD (13) 
 Anders, namelijk: (14) ____________________ 
 
Q17 Hartelijk dank voor uw medewerking! Als u kans wilt maken op de bol.com 
tegoedbon kunt u hieronder uw mailadres invullen, u krijgt dan bericht indien u heeft 
gewonnen.  
 
Q19 Het nieuwsartikel dat u heeft gelezen bestaat uit informatie van verschillende 
bronnen, namelijk NOS, Trouw, Financieel Dagblad, Milieudefensie en het 
Longfonds. Indien u vragen heeft over de enquête en/of onderzoeksresultaten kunt u 
contact opnemen met 96tarabary@gmail.com. 
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Appendix B: frames  
(word amount was not included in the survey) 
 
Frame one: security/immigration 
Defensie: "klimaatverandering bedreigt nationale veiligheid" 
 
Afgelopen eeuw is de gemiddelde aardtemperatuur gestegen met 1 graad. 2016 was 
warmste jaar ooit gemeten. Wetenschappers zijn het eens: dit is klimaatverandering 
door menselijk handelen. Broeikasgassen worden door menselijke activiteit uitgestoten 
en houden extra zonnewarmte vast om de aarde. De hoeveelheid broeikasgassen is de 
laatste 150 jaar fors gestegen. Dit komt door grote groei in populatie en energiegebruik. 
De mens verbrand fossiele brandstoffen als olie, gas en kolen, waardoor CO2 vrijkomt. 
Andere grote vervuiler is de landbouw. Jaarlijks worden 70 miljard dieren verbruikt 
voor vlees en dierlijke producten. Dit kost veel energie en grondstoffen. Bovendien 
komt veel methaan vrij, een nog sterker broeikasgas. 
Problematische gevolgen van de opwarming zijn 
smelting van poolkappen, zeespiegelstijging, 
overstromingen, orkanen, droogte met misoogsten als 
gevolg, bedreiging dier- en plantsoorten. 
Commandant der Strijdkrachten Tom Middendorp 
maakt het eind vorig jaar duidelijk: onze nationale 
veiligheid wordt bedreigd door klimaatverandering. 
Waarom? Meerderheid Nederlanders woont onder 
zeespiegel: deze stijgt gestaag. Verder zijn we voor levering fossiele brandstoffen 
afhankelijk van instabiele regio's, zoals Rusland en het Midden-Oosten. Dit maakt ons 
kwetsbaar. Verder legt Middendorp uit dat klimaatverandering bijdraagt aan conflicten. 
In Syrië ontstond chaos door extreme droogte en binnenlandse water- en 
voedseltekorten. Gecombineerd met islamitische ideologische conflicten, was dit een 
explosieve combinatie. Verder draagt klimaatchaos bij aan broedgrond voor terrorisme. 
Bovendien is er een onderbelicht probleem: klimaatvluchtelingen. Defensie legt uit dat 
er nu extreme droogte is in Afrika. Gevolg is watertekort en mislukte oogsten. Dit is 
daar een probleem, maar ook hier in Nederland. Die mensen zoeken namelijk nieuwe, 
veiligere plekken om te wonen. Deze klimaatvluchtelingen komen naar Europa, naar 
Nederland. Dit probleem wordt door politici over het hoofd gezien. Ja, er moet streng 
en rechtvaardig grensbeleid zijn. Maar, ook een lange-termijn visie met klimaatbeleid. 
Politici denken aan korte termijn winst. Ze worden beïnvloed door machtige bedrijven. 
Dit moet anders. Het Nederlandse volk heeft baat bij migratiestromen aanpakken bij 
kernoorzaken. Opvang in eigen regio is nodig. Daarom moet klimaatverandering 
beperkt worden. Anders loopt het helemaal uit de hand. Dan worden die gebieden 
maar droger en komen er steeds meer mensen onze kant op.  
Om nationale veiligheid te waarborgen, moet klimaatverandering beperkt blijven. Dit 
kan worden gedaan door efficiënter met energie en verbruik om te gaan, en snel mee te 
gaan in de transitie naar groene stroom. Broeikasgas uitstoot moet worden verminderd. 
Nederland moet het klimaat als veiligheidsprioriteit stellen. Zo ook wanneer wij in 2018 
deel uit gaan maken van de VN-veiligheidsraad, zodat het hoog op de internationale 
agenda komt te staan. - 417 woorden 
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Frame two: economy 
 
Kansen klimaatverandering: economische groei en banen 
Afgelopen eeuw is de gemiddelde aardtemperatuur gestegen met 1 graad. 2016 was 
warmste jaar ooit gemeten. Wetenschappers zijn het eens: dit is klimaatverandering 
door menselijk handelen. Broeikasgassen worden door menselijke activiteit uitgestoten 
en houden extra zonnewarmte vast om de aarde. De hoeveelheid broeikasgassen is de 
laatste 150 jaar fors gestegen. Dit komt door grote groei in populatie en energiegebruik. 
De mens verbrand fossiele brandstoffen als olie, gas en kolen, waardoor CO2 vrijkomt. 
Andere grote vervuiler is de landbouw. Jaarlijks worden 70 miljard dieren verbruikt 
voor vlees en dierlijke producten. Dit kost veel energie en grondstoffen. Bovendien 
komt veel methaan vrij, een nog sterker 
broeikasgas. Problematische gevolgen van de 
opwarming zijn smelting van poolkappen, 
zeespiegelstijging, overstromingen, orkanen, 
droogte met misoogsten als gevolg, bedreiging 
dier- en plantsoorten. 
In het Parijsakkoord in 2015 is gekozen voor 
een transitie naar duurzame energie. Nederland 
is nu nog een economie gebaseerd op fossiele brandstoffen. Vergeleken met andere 
Europese landen, bungelt Nederland achteraan wat betreft duurzame energie. Dit moet 
veranderen. De groene transitie is onvermijdelijk, hiervoor is een actieve en innovatie 
houding nodig. Nederland moet snel meegaan in de transitie naar een groene, 
circulaire, schone economie. Dan kan ons land koploper zijn en profiteren van grote 
economische mogelijkheden. Concreet betekent dit bijvoorbeeld dat geen olie meer 
wordt geïmporteerd uit het Midden-Oosten, wat daar zou worden gebruikt om hun 
land te ontwikkelen, maar dit geld in onze eigen economie wordt gestoken. Banen 
creëren in de groene energie sector, is voordelig is voor werkelozen in Nederland. Zo 
kan armoede in eigen land worden tegengegaan, en nationale economische groei 
plaatsvinden. 
 
In april 2017 riepen 90 hoogleraren de Tweede Kamer op fors te investeren in de 
nieuwe duurzame economie. Er moet worden geïnvesteerd in mensen, kennis, arbeid 
en scholing. Economische systeemwijzigingen zijn nodig, met grootschalige opwekking 
van duurzame energie. Het principe "de vervuiler betaalt" moet worden gebruikt. 
Duurzaam gedrag moet worden gestimuleerd en beloond.  
 
De investering kan zorgen dat Nederland niet achteraan bungelt. Er is sterk groeiende 
vraag naar duurzame energie uit Nederland. Onlangs is een uitzonderlijke 10-jarige 
windenergie deal met Google gesloten. Helaas besluiten multinationals soms toch voor 
een ander land te gaan. Nederland produceert namelijk nog onvoldoende groene 
stroom voor de behoeftes. Directeur van het grote havenbedrijf Groningen Seaports, 
Harm Post, wil de energietransitie als topprioriteit. Hij legt uit dat multinationals willen 
voortbestaan, en dit niet mogelijk is zonder groen te denken. Dit is niet alleen het beste 
voor het klimaat, maar ook voor de economie.  - 416 woorden 
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Frame three: health 
 
Klimaatverandering tegengaan = beschermen gezondheid  
 
Afgelopen eeuw is de gemiddelde aardtemperatuur gestegen met 1 graad. 2016 was 
warmste jaar ooit gemeten. Wetenschappers zijn het eens: dit is klimaatverandering 
door menselijk handelen. Broeikasgassen worden door menselijke activiteit uitgestoten 
en houden extra zonnewarmte vast om de aarde. De hoeveelheid broeikasgassen is de 
laatste 150 jaar fors gestegen. Dit komt door grote groei in populatie en energiegebruik. 
De mens verbrand fossiele brandstoffen als olie, gas en kolen, waardoor CO2 vrijkomt. 
Andere grote vervuiler is de landbouw. Jaarlijks worden 70 miljard dieren verbruikt 
voor vlees en dierlijke producten. Dit kost veel energie en grondstoffen. Bovendien 
komt veel methaan vrij, een nog sterker broeikasgas. Problematische gevolgen van de 
opwarming zijn smelting van poolkappen, 
zeespiegelstijging, overstromingen, orkanen, 
droogte met misoogsten als gevolg, bedreiging 
dier- en plantsoorten. 
Klimaatverandering heeft grote gevolgen voor de 
menselijke gezondheid. Door uitstoot van 
industrieën, huishoudens, vervoer en 
veehouderij wordt de lucht vervuild met fijnstof. 
Bij ademhaling wordt ongezonde fijnstof diep in 
het lichaam opgenomen. Luchtvervuiling is jaarlijks doodsoorzaak voor duizenden 
Nederlanders. Snelweguitstoot heeft hetzelfde effect als sigaretten meeroken. Kinderen 
die opgroeien met luchtvervuiling hebben later zwakkere gezondheid. Zwangere 
vrouwen hebben verhoogde kans op gezondheidsproblemen met de ongeboren baby. 
De Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie adviseert een maximum aan luchtvervuiling, maar 
onze lucht is op veel plekken veel viezer. Nederland heeft de meest vervuilde lucht van 
Europa, er is daarom grote vooruitgang te boeken. 
 
Het longfonds wijst op de gezondheidsgevaren van fijnstof inademen. Vieze lucht 
veroorzaakt en verergert longziekten als astma, COPD en longkanker. Ook hart- en 
vaatziekten zijn het gevolg. Vooral kinderen, ouderen en zwakkeren zijn slachtoffer. 
Een ander gezondheidsprobleem aan de opwarming van de temperatuur zijn dat 
infectieuze ziektes zich sneller verspreiden. Bacteriën verspreiden zich dan sneller en 
hygiëne is lastiger te waarborgen. Het is nu al zichtbaar in de hoge stijging van Malaria. 
In een opgewarmde aarde zullen steeds meer ziektes de kans krijgen zich te 
verspreiden. 
 
Het is goed om klimaatverandering tegen te gaan zodat we gezonder zijn door schonere 
lucht. Betere lucht is een lokaal gezondheidsvoordeel dat kan worden bereikt door een 
milieubewuste koers. Uitstoot moet worden verminderd. De weg hiernaartoe bevordert 
gezondheid. Als mensen vaker de fiets nemen in plaats van de auto, zullen ze meer 
bewegen. Dan neemt kans op ziektes af. Verder is het gezond als mensen minder 
verzadigde vetten als die in vlees eten. Gezondheidsproblemen zullen dan afnemen, en 
het heeft een positieve invloed op het milieu. Oplossingen die klimaatverandering 
tegengaan zijn dus tevens manieren om te zorgen dat de gezondheid van mensen 
vooruit gaat. - 417 woorden 
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Frame four: unrelated political topic 
 
Tusk: EU-lidstaten unaniem achter brexit-strategie 
 
Onlangs zijn de regeringsleiders van de 27 'achterblijvende' EU-landen het eens 
geworden over hoe de brexit moet worden aangepakt. De EU-landen steunen de 
richtlijnen voor de onderhandelingen met Londen over de brexit. Dat heeft EU-
president Donald Tusk via Twitter bekendgemaakt, tijdens een top van de 27 lidstaten 
in Brussel. De deelnemers werden het in minder dan een kwartier eens. De leidraad 
voor de brexit-onderhandelingen werd eind maart 2017 bekend gemaakt. Daarin staat 
dat eerst de uittreding uit de EU wordt geregeld. Daarna pas wil de Unie met de 
regering in Londen praten over de toekomstige relatie. De Britten zullen veel geld 
moeten betalen voor de uittreding. Deze rekening voor het verlaten wordt door 
sommige lidstaten op 60 miljard 
euro geschat. "Een gratis brexit is 
nu eenmaal niet mogelijk", zei de 
Belgische premier Michel.  
 
De Britten willen het liefst al direct 
onderhandelen over een nieuw 
handelsakkoord. Tusk wil echter 
eerst de brexit en bijbehorende 
rekening regelen. De steun van de 
lidstaten voor de richtlijnen komt 
niet als een verrassing. Wel lopen de meningen uiteen over hoe 'hard' de Britten 
moeten worden aangepakt. Hard of zacht, dat is de vraag, om Shakespeare vrij te 
citeren. De brexit-onderhandelingen bevatten alle ingrediënten voor een klassiek 
drama. Felle voorstanders van de harde lijn, zoals Angela Merkel, staan tegenover 
landen die voor een zachte aanpak zijn, zoals Finland, Zweden, Spanje en Nederland. 
 
"Groot-Brittannië moet bloeden", zegt correspondent Jeroen Wollaars over de 
gevoelens die overheersen in Duitsland. "Als het land er echt uit wil, kan dat niet 
zonder pijn." Berlijn wil voorkomen dat meer landen vertrekken. "Het beeld moet zijn 
dat een vertrek uit de EU niet vanzelf gaat en veel geld kost." De Zweden zijn 
daarentegen meer voor een pragmatische aanpak. "Er staan grote handelsbelangen op 
het spel", vertelt Scandinavië-correspondent Rolien Créton. Groot-Brittannië is een 
belangrijke afzetmarkt voor Zweden. In Oost-Europa wordt vooral gekeken naar de 
migranten. Kamermeisjes, buschauffeurs, vuilnismannen, babysitters: veel slecht betaald 
werk wordt gedaan door Polen, Hongaren, Roemenen en Bulgaren. Meer dan 850.000 
Polen en zeker 200.000 Roemenen wonen en werken in Groot-Brittannië. "De 
belangrijkste eis van Roemenië is dan ook dat staatsburgers die nu al in Groot-
Brittannië wonen, dezelfde rechten moeten behouden", zegt Balkan-correspondent 
Mitra Nazar. De Bulgaren zijn het daarmee eens. 
 
En zoals het hoort bij een goed koningsdrama is er gedoe over de erfenis. Over hoeveel 
de Britten moeten betalen, wie de Europese instellingen die nu in Groot-Brittannië 
zitten mogen overnemen. Daar zullen nog heel wat politieke discussies over volgen. - 
415 woorden 
